



Agenda

San Joaquin County Election Advisory Committee

San Joaquin County Administration Building, Training Room 146

44 N. San Joaquin St.

Stockton, CA 95202

Thursday, May 23, 2024, 6:00 PM

I. Call to Order

- 1) Pledge of Allegiance
- 2) Roll Call

II. Approve Minutes

- 1) Election Advisory Committee – Regular Meeting – April 11, 2024

III. Consent Items

- 1) Update from the Registrar of Voters Office

III. Discussion Items

- 1) Dropbox Recommendations – Holly Moore
- 2) Recommendations to Improve Election Integrity – David Robb

IV. Public Comment

V. Registrar of Voters Comments

VI. Committee Comments

VII. Schedule Next Meeting

IX. Adjournment until the next meeting in September 2024 as identified by the Election Advisory Committee in accordance with the Comprehensive Plan for the Election Advisory Committee.



May 23, 2024

MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the Election Advisory Committee
FROM: Olivia Hale, Registrar of Voters
SUBJECT: Update from the Registrar of Voters Office

The purpose of this memorandum is to update the Election Advisory Committee on Items that are being addressed by the Registrar of Voters' Office prior to the November 2024 Presidential General Election.

Upcoming Board Items:

1. Resolution for standing approval of future requests from cities and districts for election services and the consolidation of elections.

I will propose a standing resolution wherein the Board will approve future requests for election services and the consolidation of elections the cities and districts within the County may submit to the Registrar of Voters' Office pursuant to a resolution passed and adopted by the governing bodies of said cities and districts. This will streamline our processes and enhance the effectiveness of election administration in San Joaquin County. The Board is scheduled to discuss and potentially adopt this resolution on June 4, 2024.

2. Certification and Acceptance of SJCERA Election Results

The San Joaquin County Employees' Retirement Association (SJCERA) election results will be certified on June 18, 2024. These results will be formally accepted at the Board of Supervisors meeting scheduled for July 9, 2024. This acceptance will conclude the administrative process for the 2024 SJCERA election.

Election Officer Training & Polling Locations Update:

I want to apprise the Committee of the post-election assessment activities my office has undertaken to improve election administration in advance of the November 2024 Presidential Election.

1. An analysis of all Help Desk tickets submitted by elections officers (EO) to the Register of Voters' Help Desk team during the March 2024 Presidential Primary Election has revealed a few opportunities to improve EO performance on election day:



- **Poll Pad Logins and Passwords:** We received calls from EOs at nearly all the polling locations with inquiries related to login issues. Enhanced training on digital access will be implemented.
 - **Physical Equipment Needs:** There is a demand for additional tables and chairs at some polling locations. The supply lists for each polling location will be reviewed and updated to include more tables and chairs. The ROV Warehouse has an adequate number of tables and chairs in stock.
 - **Physical Security:** Cable lock seals are needed to secure equipment compartments with V-drives. V-drives are special thumb drives formatted for a specific San Joaquin County election. IT will deploy all equipment containing V-drives with cable lock seals to eliminate any possible tampering. Please note the ROV has procedures in place to prevent altering election results by tampering with a V-drive. In the event a V-drive compartment is opened the V-drive is quarantined and not tabulated. If this occurs ROV staff rescan all the affected paper ballots and make a replacement V-drive. The “tampered” V-drive is not used and will be reformatted prior to being put back into use. The ROV utilized this process during the 2024 March Presidential Primary Election. There were 23 precincts that did not return their scan device so the ballots for those locations were rescanned at the ROV warehouse and the original V-drives from the precincts were not uploaded.
 - **Signage and Instructions:** Increased signage, specifically signage guiding the return of Verity Scans. This will aid in maintaining order and ensuring the correct handling of polling location equipment.
2. An online EO survey was offered to all EOs that worked the 2024 March Presidential Primary Election. We received a response from 275 of the 1,222 workers.

The feedback we received indicates a need for hands-on training and a revised curriculum. The new training modules will focus on operational troubleshooting, including more practical engagement and scenario-based learning. This approach will better prepare our EOs for the November 2024 Presidential General Election.

The ROV will adjust the EO training curriculum to effectively address the practical challenges identified by survey respondents. The training will include visual, hands-on, and written components. While the current training has many strengths, the online demonstration sessions conducted prior to the March 2024 Presidential Primary Election will revert to the hands-on format used in previous years. Participants will receive handouts, and unlimited access to online videos.



Additionally, scenario training will be expanded to cover not only officer positions, but also all voter scenarios.

Voter Roll Maintenance – Experian True Trace:

We are using Experian’s True Trace product to assist with voter roll maintenance. This tool assesses the full active voter roll and determines if a voter’s credit report contains any current change-of-address information. We then take that information and mail notices with postage-paid postcards to each identified voter. Any returned cards whether undeliverable or submitted by the voter will result in updating the voter file accordingly. This tool will provide additional support to maintain accurate and current voter rolls. The California Elections Code permits the use of a credit reporting agency for this purpose. True Trace will complement our existing voter roll maintenance practices mandated by the National Voter Registration Act and the Help America Vote Act.

Recommendations to the San Joaquin Board of Supervisors to improve election integrity in the county.

May 1, 2024

Prepared for the San Joaquin County Election Advisory Committee by David Robb, a Stockton resident.

Introduction

The November 2024 election promises to be one of most significant in our Nation's history. It is accordingly incumbent on us, the citizens of this country, to do everything we can to ensure that the election is fair, honest, and accurate. It is in the interest of every citizen, regardless of political party, race, creed, gender or any other factor to do all we can to that end. Therefore, we recommend the following enumerated actions be taken by our Supervisors to make our elections more secure and free from fraud and manipulation.

Recommendations and Rationale for Each

1. Engage the services of one or more third-party entities to review the county voter rolls prior to preparation of the list of qualified voters for the November 2024 Presidential election. The purpose would be to identify entries in the registration rolls that do not meet the requirements for legal voters so that they can be excluded from the list of voters who will receive ballots by mail.

Such improper entries include:

- underage voters,
- dead voters,
- current felons,
- voters who have been declared mentally incompetent,
- registrations with no voting history for the last two general elections,
- fictional voters with no existence outside the voter rolls,
- voters who have permanently moved out of the county,
- voters who are registered to vote in two or more jurisdictions,
- registrations for individuals who are not US citizens,
- registrations at addresses that do not meet residence qualifications, such as vacant lots, industrial facilities, etc.
- voters who have not provided proper verification that they are qualified to vote, as per HAVA and state requirements.

Several services are available at modest cost. Banks, mortgage firms, insurance and credit companies use these services to verify the identity and qualifications of their customers. The Board of Supervisors (BoS) can avail themselves of these services to independently guarantee that the county voter rolls contain only legal voters.

This verification should be done independent of the Registrar of Voters (RoV) to ensure public confidence in the results. The results can be provided to the RoV so that they can effect actual cleanup of the rolls. The BoS should require a detailed report from the RoV regarding cleanup and how many records of each category were affected.

The Board should be informed that significant quantities of nearly every category listed have been found in the current active voter rolls for the County. Collectively, their existence is sufficient to alter the outcome of any election, and represent a substantial threat to the integrity of our elections.

The BoS has the legal authority to engage such services under Title 2 Section 19003 of the California Elections code.

2. Supervisors must instruct the Registrar of Voters to obey California law and ensure that no equipment used in any aspect of the election is connected directly or indirectly to the internet from the first day of early voting to the day after election results are certified. They must also direct that all election systems must be publically available at all times during the election for public inspection to ensure there is no wired, wireless, or any other means of internet connection present and active at any time. The RoV must also certify and present evidence that no item of equipment has ever been connected directly or indirectly to the internet at any time from its date of manufacture to the date of its proposed use. Any equipment that cannot be so certified should not be used.

California Election Code Section 19205 states that no election equipment shall be connected to the Internet. That means never at any time. The Secretary of State website presents a list of devices considered election equipment. Nearly all electronic devices used in our elections, including tabulators, scanners, databases, computers, and other systems have provisions for network connection and are connected to networks that may themselves have elements connected to the Internet.

If a device on a network is internet connected, then the network is internet connected, and any other device connected to the network is also internet connected. Firewalls and other technical means to prevent intrusion of a network and block malware injection do not satisfy the legal requirement prohibiting connection.

Given current communication speeds, large quantities of malware may be loaded onto a connected device in a small fraction of a second. Such malware can remain dormant and invisible until such time as it is activated. Once activated, it can function to subvert elections in many ways ranging from providing false counts, to enabling remote access to election records, to erasing or altering critical data.

California Election code does allow items to be connected to the internet if certain stringent provisions are met. This provision is largely to allow poll pads to be used at polling locations on election day. This provision is covered in Section 20154(p)(4) of the code where the conditions of use are specified.

In prior elections, in nearly every case, the provisions specified were not met, and poll pads were connected to the internet via unqualified, open, public links. As a consequence, most other systems with which they communicated, including the voter roll database systems were also internet connected through unsecured channels.

As a consequence of these unsecured connections, every piece of election equipment of the county that has ever been connected to a county network, either wired or wireless must be considered contaminated, and should be thoroughly inspected by qualified third party inspectors prior to further use. Any contaminated equipment must be identified and decertified for use. The inspectors must provide the BoS with a complete report of the equipment inspected, the inspection results, and recommendations for further action.

3. All election systems and results must be audited and the audit approved before the election results are certified. The election results must not be certified until and unless favorable audit results are obtained. The Registrar of Voters should not conduct such an audit, but must be directed to cooperate fully with the audit team. The sheriff's office and relevant county officials can provide oversight of the audit team, but it should otherwise be independent and autonomous so long as no laws are broken.

Numerous vulnerabilities in our election systems have been identified by many qualified individuals and organizations. At present, there are few real estimates of

the amount of fraud and manipulation present in our elections. Various authorities assure us, without providing any proof, that any fraud that might be present is small and insignificant.

However, investigations have determined there was a minimum of 15% fraudulent ballots counted in a recent local election. Current investigations show that a significantly higher percentage is likely at present. That amount is sufficient to render the results of almost any race indeterminate and incapable of certification.

The Supervisors can commission an election audit team comprised of local volunteers to examine all aspects of the election - from technology, to systems, to procedures, to results, and assess the ability of the election to produce reliable results. Costs would be minimal as it is likely that local CPAs, business professionals, professors and others would be willing to volunteer and assist in conducting an audit without charge.

As for conduct of an audit, the guidelines presented by a professional auditor with experience in election auditing, Joseph Fried, CPA, in his book "Debunked?" provide a good foundation for what can be audited, and how it should be audited to ensure an honest election that the public can trust. Such assurance is essential to secure public acceptance of election results, especially if the audit is transparent and results are publically available.

Public mistrust in elections has grown in recent years, largely because officials have been unwilling to admit the possibility of fraud, to examine allegations of election fraud, have dismissed and discounted evidence, and in most cases have tried to discredit public concerns of election fraud as nonsense or "conspiracy theories".

Such actions do not promote public trust in our elections, our institutions, or in the people who are entrusted with our government. A comprehensive public audit will go far toward restoring trust, even if it points out deficiencies that must be remedied.

4. The Supervisors should commission a parallel hand count of the election to be conducted simultaneously with machine tabulation of ballots.

Obsolete information provided by the California Secretary of State and the San Joaquin Registrar of Voters has been cited to "prove" that hand counting is error prone, expensive, and unreliable. To the contrary, modern hand counting methods are superior in every aspect to machine tabulation. They are as fast or faster, typically far less expensive, and exhibit ZERO errors, all in contrast to machine counting.

The modern "Missouri Method" of hand counting has been thoroughly tested and used in several elections. **Actual results show that it can provide accurate counts of an election at considerably less cost than current machine tabulation systems. Further, by incorporating accuracy checks similar to those employed in double entry bookkeeping, election results can be tabulated with NO error, unlike machine systems that exhibit a variety of errors.**

Trained volunteer audit teams can process ballots at rates that are comparable to the rate of machine systems without sacrifice of accuracy or cost.

Recent California law was enacted to force use of machine counting in nearly all elections. However, it did not, and does not preclude parallel hand counting. It only stipulates that the PRIMARY means for determining election results must be through machine counts. It does not prohibit hand counting to verify machine results, and, in fact, mandates hand counts in the event an election is contested!

There are several benefits to be obtained from a parallel hand count of election results:

- any discrepancies resulting from machine errors, from malware activities, or intentional manipulations will be made visible so that appropriate remedial actions can be taken to ensure accurate counts.

- parallel counting will greatly enhance public trust in the outcome of the election, as the hand count processes have a transparency and trustworthiness that machine counting lacks.

- parallel hand counting methods will reduce the possibility of accidental, or intentional manipulations, such as duplicate counting, uncounted batches, and other issues. By incorporating a hand count step following machine counting, with supervised transport of batches, the opportunities for error or manipulation are greatly reduced.

- implementation of parallel hand counting demonstrates to the public that the Supervisors are concerned about honest elections, are taking measures to ensure election integrity, and are listening to the concerns of their constituency.

There are several other reforms that might be implemented, but this set will go far to address issues that are known to affect election integrity, and that reflect genuine concerns of the people of the county.

May 6, 2024

Dear Election Advisory Committee,

Thank you for inviting me to give you a presentation on Drop Boxes at the meeting on April 11, 2024. As a follow-up, here is a list of suggestions for you to present to the Board of Supervisors.

1. Number: Install only 13 drop boxes instead of the current 25 that are in place. This will cut costs for taxpayers while meeting California laws.
2. Location: The drop boxes should be located at fire stations and police stations. This will provide greater security for drop boxes.
3. Ask the sheriff's department to investigate the fraud that drop boxes with a capacity of 1,542 ballots were officially recorded as holding 3,316, 2,293, 1,700, 1,865 and 1,693 ballots.

I respectfully submit these recommendations to you.

Thank you for your dedication to clean elections in San Joaquin County.

Sincerely,

Holly Moore

San Joaquin County Republican Party Election Integrity Officer